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PARASITISM AND DISJUNCTIVISM IN NYĀYA 
EPISTEMOLOGY
Matthew R. Dasti
Department of Philosophy, Bridgewater State University
From the early modern period, Western epistemologists have often been concerned 
with a rigorous notion of epistemic justification, epitomized in the work of D escartes: 
properly held beliefs require insulation from extreme skepticism. To the degree that 
veridical cognitive states may be indistinguishable from non-veridical states, appar-
ently veridical states cannot enjoy high-grade positive epistemic status. Therefore, a 
good believer begins from what are taken to be neutral, subjective experiences and 
reasons outward — hopefully identifying the kinds of appearances that properly link 
up to the world and those that do not. Good beliefs, beliefs that are justified (war-
ranted, etc.), are those that a believer has consciously arrived at by such reasoning 
(or, in a weaker version, those that could be consciously arrived at by such reasoning 
if required). This approach, which I will occasionally call a Cartesian approach, has 
two important features. First, it considers doubt a legitimate default position in the 
space of reasons. The burden of proof is upon the believer to defend her belief. In the 
absence of such a defense, belief is suspect. Second, one’s cognitive starting point 
consists in alethically neutral cognitive states as described above.
The tradition that I will discuss in this essay, the Nyāya school of classical India, 
looks at things from a very different perspective. It defends what may be called epis-
temic trust as the proper default position. Furthermore, Nyāya has a conception of 
knowledge sources as faculties that directly connect us to a mind-independent world, 
irrespective of the potential for indistinguishable error states. Despite such potential 
for error, Nyāya argues that when we get things right, we directly gain purchase on 
an external world. This notion of direct openness to the world is tied deeply to 
Nyāya’s epistemic trust. Though, indeed, various sorts of factors trigger review, 
d efense, and, if required, rejection of belief, the notion that we must step outside our 
knowledge-producing faculties and pass judgment on their overall effectiveness is 
held to be a fantasy that is unnecessary, pragmatically troublesome, and ultimately 
incoherent.
This essay will examine a battery of Nyāya arguments in support of default trust 
and a ground-level realism, which I collectively call arguments from parasitism. 
These are meant to prove that error presupposes veridical cognition, and, this being 
the case, we cannot even engage in philosophical reflection and critique unless we 
appeal to a background of true belief and a baseline cognitive connection with the 
real world. Given that we must acknowledge such a connection, trust is therefore 
taken to be the correct default epistemic attitude. I will illustrate and classify various 
forms that the argument takes, consider allied arguments further offered by Nyāya, 
and suggest ways in which Naiyāyikas may respond to certain challenges. I conclude 
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by noting a few ways in which Nyāya anticipates the contemporary philosophical 
movement known as disjunctivism. I will start, however, by framing the discussion 
with an introduction to Nyāya epistemology.
The Theory of Knowledge Sources (Pramāṇas)
One of Nyāya’s central contributions to Indian thought — arguably its primary 
c ontribution — is the articulation and development of an epistemological theory 
c entered on pramāṇas or knowledge sources. Nyāya conceives of pramāṇas as 
knowledge-producing mechanisms or processes. Representative are definitions by 
the early thinkers Uddyotakara (ca. 650 c.e.) — “pramāṇa is a cause of cognition” 
(upalabdhi-hetu pramāṇam) — and Jayanta (ca. 875 c.e.) — “pramāṇa is a cause of 
veridical cognition” (pramā-karaṇam pramāṇam). Knowledge sources are specified 
by Nyāya as perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), and 
testimony (śabda).1
Pioneering scholars of Nyāya have framed its epistemology as a causal theory of 
knowledge in which a pramāṇa is a cause of knowledge par excellence, in the sense 
of proximate cause or trigger.2 Indeed, various structural features of Nyāya recom-
mend comparison with contemporary externalism or reliabilism, the view that a be-
lief’s positive epistemic status is a function of the reliability of its connection to the 
truth. More precisely, it resembles process reliabilism, the view that a belief partakes 
of positive epistemic status if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process. 
Much of Nyāya’s epistemological program is focused on the task of identifying and 
typifying such cognitive processes. Nyāya defends its typology of pramāṇas with 
great care.
Straightforward comparison between Nyāya’s pramāṇa theory and reliabilism 
becomes quickly strained, however, by a curious feature of Nyāya’s view, the notion 
that pramāṇas are inerrant. The following are representative statements by various 
Naiyāyikas (practitioners of Nyāya) of the early school. Gautama (ca. 200 c.e.), the 
sūtra-kāra, defines perceptual cognition:
Perceptually produced cognition arises from the connection of sense faculty and sense 
object, does not depend on language, is inerrant, and is definite. (Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4; my 
emphasis)3
Vātsyāyana (ca. 450 c.e.), the earliest known commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra, says: 
“a pramāṇa has truth as its object” (NB 3.1.51; ND 771).4 Uddyotakara says: “That 
which errs is not a pramāṇa” (NV 2.1.37; ND 515).5 As noted above, Jayanta defines 
pramāṇa as a “cause of veridical cognition.” He further argues that qualifications like 
inerrancy, given in the perception sūtra (NS 1.1.4), range over the definitions of all 
pramāṇa types:
Someone may propose that irregular causes of veridical cognition would be pramāṇas. 
So to exclude causes of memory, doubt, and wrong cognition, three words from the per-
ception sūtra (Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4), “caused by the object” (artha-utpannam), “inerrant” 
(avyabhicārī), and “determinate” (vyavasāyātmakam), should be carried over (to the defi-
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nitions of all the pramāṇas). For they apply in general to the set of four (perception, infer-
ence, analogy, and testimony). (Nyāya-mañjarī, ed. Varadacharya in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa 1969, 
p. 73)6
Commenting on the term “object-possessing” (arthavat) in Vātsyāyana’s opening 
phrase, “A pramāṇa is arthavat since successful action follows from pramāṇa-born 
cognition of an object,”7 Vācaspati (ca. 950 c.e.) explains:
The word arthavat employs the possessive affix (vat), which indicates necessary linkage 
(nitya-yoga). The condition of necessity (nityatā) means non-deviation. The import is that 
a pramāṇa does not deviate from its object. A pramāṇa’s non-deviation amounts to the 
fact that there will never be a contradiction anywhere, anytime, in any other conditions, 
between the nature of the object and the predicate provided by the pramāṇa. (Tātparyaṭīkā 
1.1.1; ND 3)8
Some scholars of Nyāya have found the idea of inerrant pramāṇas troubling and 
philosophically indefensible. By their lights, to claim (for example) that our p erceptual 
faculty never fails or that testimony never leads us astray flies in the face of our most 
common experience. What are normally taken to be our most reliable knowledge-
producing faculties (e.g., perception, inference, testimony) are clearly not inerrant. It 
is suggested that Naiyāyikas, being good philosophers, would not hold such a bad 
view.9 They would read Naiyāyikas as wholesale reliabilists, holding that pramāṇas 
are fallible, but on the whole reliable knowledge-producing mechanisms.
Nyāya’s position is not, however, as strange as it may sound at first blush. As will 
be seen below, Nyāya privileges veridical, truth-entailing mental states and considers 
error conceptually parasitical upon knowledge. This entails a disjunctive account of 
pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa states. That Nyāya’s knowledge sources are thought of as 
inerrant or factive is not a problem in such a view. Nyāya recognizes that there are 
error states that are subjectively indistinguishable from knowledge states. But this 
does not lead it to adopt a “highest-common-factor” view, where what is taken to be 
fundamental is an alethically neutral mental state. Rather, there are genuine pramāṇa-
produced veridical states, and there are states not produced by pramāṇas, error states 
that imitate veridical cognition (in Sanskrit, pramāṇa-ābhāsa, a “semblance of 
pramāṇa”). This disjunctive conception will be reconsidered in the final section of 
this essay.
Arguments from Parasitism
Moving to our main discussion, what supports Nyāya’s attitude of epistemic trust, 
which takes the form of a ground-level confidence that our cognitive faculties gain 
purchase on a mind-independent world? There are a few methods by which Nyāya 
supports a default trust in cognition. Most famously, perhaps, it argues that default 
doubt would stultify us, undermining our pursuit of various worthy goals in life. 
Given that the primary reason we reflect upon cognition is to become more effective 
in pursuit of our life’s goals, an epistemology of default doubt, which undercuts 
our ability to function, would be pragmatically undesirable.10 The argument from 
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parasitism, which establishes the primacy of veridical cognition, makes no such appeal 
to pragmatic considerations, and is therefore among the more powerful theoretical 
planks in Nyāya’s position. The upshot of this argument is that illusion and cognitive 
misfires of other sorts are parasitical on veridical experience. Error presupposes ve-
ridicality, and therefore, unless we conceive of our cognitive faculties as having some 
core connection to truth, we lose the very basis by which we may understand and 
reflect upon error states. Given this, it is right to start with an “innocent until l egitimate 
doubt” approach. What follows are a number of general illustrations of the argument.
In response to a Buddhist interlocutor, who contends that everything exists in a 
state of flux, and therefore that all cognitions of enduring things are false, U ddyotakara 
argues:
False cognitions are imitations of correct cognitions. Therefore, you must provide some 
example of correct cognition. (NV 2.1.16; ND 436)11
False experience as of an enduring thing imitates or conforms (anusāra) to some true 
experience of an enduring thing. More specifically, the interlocutor must explain 
what kind of original, veridical experience could have generated the concept of an 
enduring thing, which we are said to then mis-ascribe to fluctuating streams. In a 
similar context, against an opponent who considers motion to be unreal, Uddyota-
kara argues:
All false cognitions imitate primary cognitions. You must state the original cognitions 
upon which the false ones are based. For we never find such a difference (between imita-
tors and genuine things) without an original, as seen in the case of mistaken cognition of 
a post as a man. There being an existing post, one has the cognition “that is a post” regard-
ing a person (in the distance). Or, there being a man, a post is mistaken for a man. (NV 
2.1.33; ND 483)12
Mistaking a post for a person in the distance is a standard example of perceptual 
i llusion in Indian discourse. Uddyotakara is arguing that such illusion, in which con-
cept V is wrongly deployed in reference to an existing object d, requires that concept 
V be generated by prior experience of something V (or, it is implied, at least built out 
of sub-concepts that were appropriately experienced). This requires that at some 
point in the causal chain a veridical cognition be obtained by which the concept 
person was acquired.
In his commentary on Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.36, Vātsyāyana confronts a mereological 
nihilist, who argues that perceptual experience as of composite wholes is an error 
owing to ignorance of minute differences amongst micro-entities. The objector claims 
that as a forest is merely a collection of trees seen at a distance, or an army is a col-
lection of soldiers, what are commonly taken to be composite wholes are nothing 
more than heaps of micro-entities. In his response, Vātsyāyana again appeals to the 
conceptual dependence of error upon the veridical:
[Vātsyāyana:] If there is an experience as of a single thing owing to non-perception of the 
differences between atoms — which are in truth separate and various, then such is a case 
of erroneous cognition, like the cognition of a post as a man.
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[Opponent:] What of it?
[Vātsyāyana:] As a false cognition of something as something else depends on the origi-
nal, it establishes the original.
[Opponent:] In the erroneous cognition of a post as a man, what is the original?
[Vātsyāyana:] The cognition of a man where there really is a man. Given the existence of 
that veridical cognition, one has the cognition “this is a man” regarding a post, because 
one apprehends the similarity between the post and a man. (NB 2.1.36; ND 503-4)13
Vātsyāyana further argues that since his opponent holds that the experience as of a 
composite whole is always fallacious, there is no original veridical experience to 
which the error in question can be compared and found wanting. The opponent thus 
cannot provide an adequate account of the error that he cites.
In the arguments above, specific metaphysical theses are under consideration, 
and generally Nyāya defends commonsense realism against the attacks of idealists 
and anti-realists. The basic principle, however, is that falsehood presupposes true 
cognition. A theme that emerges is that in doubting the basis of the connection be-
tween cognition and reality, we lose the very distinction on which illusion or error 
makes sense. This is reiterated in the fourth book of the Nyāya-sūtra (4.2.31 ff.), in a 
more straightforwardly epistemological context. Here, we will begin to classify the 
specific forms that the argument from parasitism takes.
The sūtra’s interlocutor, apparently a Mādhyamīka Buddhist, argues that appeal 
to pramāṇas does not settle the issue of the real (and independent) existence of 
things:14
[Opponent:] The notion of knowledge sources (pramāṇas) and objects of knowledge is 
akin to that of dreams and their objects. [In his commentary Vātsyāyana elucidates the 
opponent’s position:] As the objects within dreams are false but taken to be real, so, too, 
are the pramāṇas and their objects.15
The Nyāya response (in sūtras 4.2.33–37) has many facets. Central to this study is the 
contention that dreams are understood as dreams only in distinction with waking 
consciousness and, therefore, that the Buddhist has illicitly helped himself to a case 
of accepted veridical experience in order to frame his thesis. Vātsyāyana:
It is only because the experience of something can establish its existence that non- 
experience of it can establish its non-existence. And if in both states (waking and dream-
ing), the objects of experience did not exist, then non-experience would have no power 
to prove anything (NB 4.2.33; ND 1078).16
We know that dream objects are false because upon waking we no longer perceive 
them. Our non-experience of them indicates that they lack a “staying power” that 
external objects are taken to possess. But non-experience’s cognitive efficacy de-
pends on that of experience. It is only because the latter is informative that we can 
trust that our non-experience of something (in the appropriate conditions) is evi-
dence that it does not exist. I know that there is no elephant in my office because if 
6 Philosophy East & West
there were an elephant, I would see it, thereby establishing its existence. A nalogously, 
if we did not take our enduring experience of objects in the waking state to be suffi-
cient prima facie proof that they exist, the non-existence of dream objects would not 
suffice to indicate that they do not exist in the waking state. The cognitive distinction 
between dreams and waking awareness, upon which the objector’s analogy rests, 
would be undermined by his very thesis.
A reconstruction of Vātsyāyana’s argument:
1.  The experience of external objects (by way of pramāṇas) is false and mislead-
ing, akin to the experience of dream objects (hypothesis for reductio).
2.  Dream objects are known to be false only in contrast with real objects, expe-
rienced in waking life (as apprehended by pramāṇas).
3.  If we do not experience real objects in waking life, we do not know dream 
objects to be false.
4.  We do know dream objects to be false.
5.  Therefore, we do (generally) experience real objects in waking life (by way of 
pramāṇas).
The conclusion contradicts premise 1, which, as the weakest of the premises, is re-
jected. The “parasitism” premise is premise 2, and it bears the most dialectical weight 
in the argument. This argument about dreaming and waking is easily analogized 
concerning similar questions of illusion and other kinds of error in relation to v eridical 
experience. This version of the parasitism argument is epistemic. Knowing error is 
parasitical upon knowing truth (at an appropriate level of generality).17
Later, Vātsyāyana provides another kind of argument from parasitism:
The mis-cognition of something depends upon an original. The cognition of a post — which 
is not a person — as a person depends upon an original. Indeed, there is no experience as 
of a person regarding something that is not a person, if a person was never experienced 
in the past. (NB 4.2.34; ND 1085)18
Clearly, here the parasitism is causal. Illusions of the sort described require, as a 
causal condition, the deployment of concepts like person. The concept person, it is 
held, requires the prior experience of actual men and women.19 As noted above, this 
is tied to Nyāya’s empiricism. Nyāya’s theory of error is a theory of misplacement 
(anyathā-khyāti). False cognition generally involves the mis-ascription of concepts 
generated in past experience to something that is presently the object of a cognitive 
state. In illusion and other kinds of error states, the wrong concept is deployed in 
reference to the object of current experience, leading the predication portion of cog-
nition (the viśeṣaṇa) astray, so to speak. The cognition is bifurcated, with part of it 
targeting the object “in view,” while another part targets an object properly qualified 
by the mis-ascribed concept. Thus, every token error presupposes some direct cogni-
tive contact with reality, which engenders the concept currently misplaced.20
Uddyotakara supports this position with a third kind of parasitism argument, a 
parasitism of meaning. An opposing interlocutor contends that “there are no external 
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objects; only consciousness exists.” Uddyotakara argues that given such a view, the 
opponent bears the burden of accounting for the content of the concepts or words 
deployed in states mistakenly thought to reveal an external world:
If you claim that “consciousness takes the form of words,” then explain what is meant by 
form. When something is mistaken for something else owing to similarity, it is said to 
share its form. Given your position, however, words do not exist, and therefore the state-
ment “awareness takes the form of words” is meaningless. (NV 4.2.34; ND 1082)21
The immediate context of this passage is Uddyotakara’s claim that in the absence of 
a mind-independent, shared world, his interlocutor would be unable to argue his 
case, since we only experience the content of another’s thoughts by means of exter-
nal intermediaries (presumably, things like our sense organs and the air, which 
c onveys the sound waves that encode speech, etc.). In response, he notes that his 
interlocutor may claim that consciousness simply takes the form of speech. That is, 
we may have awareness of words in an entirely idealist framework, much as we may 
have conscious states that resemble things like trees or rocks or physical bodies. 
U ddyotakara’s claim is that for conscious states to “take the form” or resemble some-
thing else, there must indeed be some other thing which they appropriately resemble 
or target. If not, it makes no sense to speak of them as “taking the form” of anything.
Uddyotakara provides a concrete example. The opponent contends that merely 
owing to differences in karmic influence, people may have different experiences, as 
of a river, without need for an external object to “ground” their experience. Uddyo-
takara responds:
He must be asked how consciousness arises in that very form (the form of specific ob-
jects). If consciousness takes the form of blood, then you must explain what blood is. 
Similarly, the form of water and river must be explained. In the sentence “They see a river 
of pus,” each word, when examined individually, is found to be meaningless, if there are 
no real external objects. (NV 4.2.34; ND 1085)22
Concepts, if divorced entirely from engagement with external reality, lose their con-
tent. As I understand it, the import is that having an illusion or hallucination of blood 
requires that we be able to deploy the concept of blood. But if we have never had the 
appropriate kinds of interactions with blood and such, we would not have such con-
cepts. Analogously, the word “blood” would be drained of meaning.23 Again, this is 
a parasitism of meaning.
Allied Arguments
I would like to note briefly another kind of dependence discussed by Nyāya. Error 
states require real causal mechanisms that undergird cognitive processes. When we 
recognize various sorts of error states, we note that there are often identifiable causal 
systems that account for the existence and nature of the error. Vātsyāyana notes that 
mirages of water arise out of the causal relations between sun rays, the earth, and a 
viewer’s perceptual organ. As such, he notes that at an appropriate level of g enerality, 
false cognition requires some real causes (NB 4.2.35; ND 1088). Therefore, whole-
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sale anti-realism is untenable. One must admit real, external causal mechanisms in 
order to account for error states.
An allied but separate line of argument holds that some kind of dependence on 
pramāṇas is required for rational reflection and communication. Therefore, even an 
ardent skeptic must begin from a position of epistemic trust. One such argument in-
volves the requirements for engaging in rational debate or discussion. Should a skep-
tic attack the ability of pramāṇas to deliver the truth, a general retort (seen in, e.g., 
commentaries on NS 2.1.11) is that without recognition of knowledge-delivering 
pramāṇas of some kind, arguments gain no traction, since rational persuasion re-
quires appeal to trusted sources of knowledge. Further, the institution of language, 
which a skeptic unreflectively and trustingly employs, presupposes the proper func-
tioning of knowledge sources of various kinds. Gaṅgeśa notes that, among other 
things, participating in conversation or debate presupposes the reliability of one’s 
own memory and of the general correlations that undergird inductive reasoning. The 
skeptic trusts the deliverances of memory in that the words she employs have been 
united with certain meanings in past experience. She further trusts inductive general-
ization, exemplified in the trust that utterances tied to certain meanings in the past 
will continue in present discourse.24
Given all of the arguments above, Naiyāyikas did not attempt to stand outside 
the deliverances of pramāṇas in order to critique them. As adverted to repeatedly in 
the sūtras, such is not possible, as one would lose the very resources for rational re-
flection altogether. Rather, Nyāya articulates a theory of default trust in pramāṇas and 
critiques individual cognitions as the need arises. As attacks are marshaled against 
the pramāṇa system, the Naiyāyikas’ dialectical position is that they need only rebut 
such challenges or indicate that somehow the challenger is subtly relying on 
pramāṇas, though without acknowledging it, and is thus guilty of self-referential 
i ncoherence. Default trust in cognition and a fundamental realism are thus woven 
together in a host of arguments that appeal to parasitism of various kinds.
In summary, we have identified three forms of the argument from parasitism, and 
three allied non-parasitical arguments:
1.  Epistemic parasitism. Recognizing that error is parasitical upon on knowing 
truth.
2.  Causal parasitism. Any concept V that an individual deploys in various sorts 
of error states ultimately depends upon her original veridical apprehension of 
some instance of V (or of sub-concepts, which are then combined in one’s 
mind).
3.  Parasitism of content or meaning. Divorced from connection with external 
reality, concepts would be drained of content, as would the words whose 
meanings are tied to the concepts they express.
Other arguments:
1.  Argument from causal networks. False awareness requires a real causal net-
work, which undergirds the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to cognition.
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2.  Argument from probative force. Rational persuasion requires appeal to 
pramāṇas of one kind or another.
3.  Argument from language. The institution of language presupposes the proper 
functioning of memory and truth of various kinds of vyāptis (inductive gener-
alizations).
Anticipating the Disjunctive Turn
I think there is much that is attractive in Nyāya’s multifaceted argument in defense of 
epistemic trust. It provides a principled defense of realism and a principled response 
to skepticism that seeks not to work though the parameters set by the skeptic but 
rather to subvert them. Moreover, the “innocent until legitimate doubt” approach has 
many interesting applications to various fields of inquiry, including philosophies of 
science and religion. I would like to close this essay by calling attention to the fact 
that Nyāya’s arguments from parasitism and its notion of the inerrancy of pramāṇas 
tie together in a neat way that anticipates an important development in contemporary 
philosophy, commonly called disjunctivism (specifically epistemological disjunctiv-
ism).25
Here, we may recall the earlier discussion of pramāṇa inerrancy. While Nyāya 
admits that any given instance of non-veridical cognition may be mistaken for a ve-
ridical cognition, it resists the Cartesian move to prioritize alethically neutral “ap-
pearance states.” In the Cartesian response, both veridical and non-veridical states 
share a deep common core — an alethically neutral core — and the only difference 
between them takes place “outside” cognition. Such neutral states would be cap-
tured in phrases like “I am having the experience as of a computer in front of me” 
where the “as of” locution evinces neutrality toward the veridicality of the experi-
ence. The Cartesian quest is to start from what is taken to be directly present to con-
sciousness, identified as such appearance states, and then try to work “outward” 
toward knowledge of the world.
By its arguments from parasitism, Nyāya resists the move “upward” to a funda-
mental cognitive state that may be amenable to both veridical experience and error. 
In this vein, Naiyāyikas would ask how a state can be “as of” a computer if we have 
no confident awareness of what a computer is in the first place. Nyāya rather stresses 
that our basic relation to the world is one of veridical experience, and that error is 
best thought of as a separate kind of mental state that is sometimes indistinguishable 
from the real thing. Moreover (and what I take to be the deep insight of Vātsyāyana’s 
appeal to dreams versus waking states), the very condition by which we develop the 
skill of indentifying cognitive error and making the Cartesian jump to a higher- order 
reflection upon belief is the awareness of a difference between veridical and erro-
neous cognition — an awareness that requires acknowledgment of veridical cognition 
from the start.
The arguments from parasitism are thus complemented by Nyāya’s theory of 
pramāṇa-ābhāsa, fallacious cognitive states that misleadingly look like the real thing. 
In the work of early Naiyāyikas, we find a great concern with this ābhāsa. For ex-
ample, after speaking of pramāṇa as that which produces “definitive ascertainment 
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of an object” (artha-paricchedaka) Uddyotakara (NV 1.1.1; ND 7–8) notes the exis-
tence of a second thing, an impostor of a pramāṇa (pramāṇa-pratirūpa). This impos-
tor is called pramāṇa-ābhāsa, a pseudo-pramāṇa or semblance of a pramāṇa, and is 
differentiated from the genuine article in that pramāṇa is arthavat (factive) while the 
ābhāsa is anarthaka (errant). The latter is spoken of under the heading of pramāṇa 
only in a figurative sense (pramāṇam ity upacaryyate). This distinction provides a 
vocabulary by which Nyāya may recognize the phenomenal indistinguishability 
b etween true and false cognitive presentations without collapsing them into a core 
identical mental state.
Contemporary epistemological disjunctivism joins Nyāya in affirming the pri-
macy of the veridical. Non-veridical cognitive states are held to be of a different 
fundamental kind from veridical states (hence, the name “disjunctivism”). Epistemo-
logical disjunctivism is thus a rejection of the Cartesian picture, and an affirmation of 
the power of our basic cognitive faculties to directly grasp the world. John M cDowell’s 
remarks are paradigmatic:
But suppose we say — not at all unnaturally — that an appearance that such-and-such is 
the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-such is the case mak-
ing itself perceptually manifest to someone. As before, the object of experience in the 
deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive 
cases too the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls 
short of the fact itself. (McDowell 2009 [1982], p. 80)
That a number of arguments given by pioneering disjunctivists echo Nyāya’s 
position26 underscores the fact that an engagement with Nyāya (and other Indian 
philosophies more generally) is not merely an exercise in philosophical history. There 
are enduring insights in the Nyāya view that anticipate and speak to contemporary 
developments and that may be mined for further contributions. Moreover, that the 
Nyāya position exists at all is useful for contemporary disjunctivism, as it gives sup-
port to the contention that disjunctivism need not be seen as a mere reaction. It may 
be motivated independently, as seen in a tradition never set against a dominant Car-
tesianism, but ever ready to challenge its presuppositions. In the other direction, I 
think that the parallels with disjunctivism set an agenda for further Nyāya research. 
Its approach to knowledge seems to resemble aspects of the disjunctivist position,27 
and tracing its development along those lines would, I think, illumine the cohesion 
of its core epistemological commitments.
Notes
I would like to thank David Ivy, Tristan Johnson, David Sosa, and especially Stephen 
Phillips for helpful discussion and criticism.
1   –   Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.3. Clearly, Nyāya takes pramāṇa types to be something like 
cognitive natural kinds. See Dasti 2010, chap. 1, and Phillips unpublished.
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2   –   Mohanty’s statement is representative: “It is a peculiar feature of the Indian 
epistemologies that this causal meaning of pramāṇa is also taken to imply a 
legitimizing sense so that a cognition is true in case it is brought about in the 
right sort of way” (Mohanty 2000, p. 16). Also see, e.g., Matilal 1986, Phillips 
1995, and the introduction to Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya 2004.
3   –   indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-utpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyava-
sāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam.
4   –   pramāṇasya tattva-viṣayatvāt. “NB” refers to the Nyāya-bhāṣya, Vātsyāyana’s 
commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra. The succeeding numbers refer to the sūtras on 
which the commentary is made. “ND” refers to the Nyāya-darśana, a standard 
text of the Nyāya-sūtra with a number of important commentaries, listed in the 
Bibliography below under the names of its editors, Taranatha Nyāya-Tarkatirtha 
and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha.
5   –   yad vyabhicāri tat pramāṇam na bhavati. “NV” refers to the Nyāya-vārttika, 
 Uddyotakara’s commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra.
6   –   aśuddha-pramiti-vidhāyinas tu prāmāṇyam prasajyata iti smṛti-saṁśaya-
viparyaya-janaka-vyavacchedāya pratyakṣa-sūtrāt artha-utpannam iti avyabhi-
cārī iti vyavasāyātmakam iti ca pada-trayam ākṛṣyate tad hi pramāṇa-catuṣṭaya- 
sādhāraṇam.
7   –   pramāṇato ‘rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam.
8   –   tathā hi pramāṇam arthavad iti, nitya-yoge matup. nityatā ca avyabhicāritā. tena 
artha-avyabhicārī ity arthaḥ. iyam eva ca artha-avyabhicāritā pramāṇasya, 
yad-deśa-kāla-antara-avasthā-antara-avisaṁvādo ‘rtha-svarūpa-prakārayos tad-
upadarśitayoḥ.
9   –   See Ganeri 2007 and Saha 2003. For response and discussion, see Dasti and 
Phillips 2010 and Ganeri 2010.
10   –   See Vācaspati Miśra’s commentary on NS 1.1.5, ND 139.
11   –   mithyā-pratyayāś ca samyak-pratyaya-anusārena bhavanti iti kva āmī samyak-
pratyayā bhavanti iti vaktavyam.
12   –   sarvā etā mithyā-buddayaḥ pradhāna-anukāreṇa bhavanti iti pradhānaṁ vak-
tavyam. na hi niṣpradhānaṁ bhāktaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ sthāṇu-puruṣavad iti yathā sthāṇau 
sati puruṣe sthānur iti buddhiḥ puruṣe vā sati sthāṇau puruṣa-buddhir iti. A 
similar point is made (against a different opponent) in NV 4.1.33.
13   –   nānā-bhāve ca aṇunāṁ pṛthaktvasya agrahaṇād abhedena ekam iti grahaṇam 
atasmiṁs tad iti pratyayaḥ yathā sthāṇau puruṣa iti. tataḥ kiṁ? atasmiṁs tad iti 
pratyayasya pradhāna-apekṣitvāt pradhāna-siddhiḥ. sthāṇau puruṣa iti praty-
ayasya kiṁ pradhānam? yo ‘sau puruṣe puruṣa-pratyayaḥ tasmin sati puruṣa-
sāmānya-grahaṇāt sthānau puruṣo ‘yam iti.
14   –   The Buddhist position has been alternatively framed as idealist, skeptical, and, 
more generally, anti-realist. In any case, the core thesis to which Nyāya is 
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 opposed is that we are radically mistaken about our experience of apparently 
external objects of common experience. The leading Buddhist idealists with 
whom early Nyāya contends are Vasubandhu (ca. 350 c.e.), Dignāga (ca. 525 
c.e.), and Dharmakīrti (ca. 625 c.e.). The leading “skeptic” (or, at least, anti-
realist) was Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 c.e.).
15   –   svapna-viṣaya-abhimānavat ayaṁ pramāṇa-prameya-abhimānaḥ . . . yathā 
svapne na viṣayāḥ santy atha ca abhimāno bhavati, eva na pramāṇāni prameyāṇi 
ca santy atha ca pramāṇa-prameya-abhimāno bhavati.
16   –   upalambhāt sadbhāve saty anupalambhād abhāvaḥ siddhyati, ubhayathā tv 
abhāve na anupalambhasya samarthyam asti.
17   –   An important subtext of this argument is the requirement for non-controversial 
examples to support generalizations and presumed inferential relations. This 
need for an example, a dṛṣṭānta, is a standard part of Indian dialectics. Vātsyā-
yana’s argument could also, therefore, be understood as proving that given the 
thesis that ordinary experience is fallacious, the Buddhist lacks a comparison 
class for the claim that all cognitive presentations are dubious, since dreams are 
no longer a non-controversial instance of false cognition.
18   –   atasmiṁs tad iti ca vyavasāyaḥ pradhānāśrayaḥ. apuruṣe sthānau puruṣa iti 
vyavasāyaḥ sa pradhānāśrayaḥ na khalu puruṣe ‘nupalabdhe puruṣa ity apuruṣe 
vyavasāyo bhavati.
19   –   Vātsyāyana notes an analogy: in the case of dreams, we commonly take dream 
objects to be constructed from memories generated within waking experience.
20   –   Feldman (2005, p. 534) argues that what I am calling the causal version of the 
argument does not refute idealism (of the sort advanced by Vasubandhu), since 
all that is needed to generate the concept of x is a previous experience of x, 
whether veridical or not. I would agree, and suggest that that the epistemic and 
semantic versions of the parasitism argument are more effective in responding 
to the idealist.
21   –   atha śabda-ākāraṁ cittaṁ pratipadyate? tenāpi śabda-ākāraṁ cittaṁ ity ākāra-
artho vaktavyaḥ. ākāro hi nāma pradhāna-vastu-sāmānyād atasmiṁs tad iti 
pratyayaḥ. na ca bhavat-pakṣe śabdo vidyat’ iti śabda-ākāraṁ cittam iti 
nirabhidheyaṁ vākyam.
22   –   pṛṣṭavyo jāyate kathaṁ tathā iti. yadi rudhira-ākāram vijñānam rudhiraṁ tarhi 
vaktavyaṁ kiṁ rudhiram iti. evaṁ jala-ākāraṁ nādī-ākāraṁ ca vaktavyam. 
pūya-pūrṇāṁ paśyanti iti ca vākyasya padāni pratyekaṁ vicāryamāṇāni rūpādi-
skāndha-abhāve nirviṣayāṇi bhavanti. The graphic examples owe themselves to 
the idea that people, while hallucinating or on the brink of death, are said to see 
things like rivers of blood.
23   –   I should mention that though Nyāya was not party to a debate like contempo-
rary internalism versus externalism in philosophy of mind, clearly it would have 
sympathy with content externalism. That is, it would agree with the position that 
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the content of cognitive mental states is largely constituted by the external 
o bjects/facts to which they intend. This argument also clearly anticipates the 
semantic externalism endorsed by Putnam (1981), that the meanings of words 
are indeed grounded in real things with which one has entered into various 
causal relations.
24   –   Phillips 1995, p. 162.
25   –   There are various arenas for disjunctivist thought (particularly in philosophy of 
mind, epistemology, and theories of action). And, as to be expected, there are 
various formulations of the disjunctive position in each arena. I am focusing on 
epistemological disjunctivism here. In providing general characteristics of epis-
temological disjunctivism, I do not want to commit myself to an overly specific 
account. My understanding is, however, primarily influenced by McDowell’s 
work, as cited below.
26   –   Consider the following:
When we set [the subjective “space of concepts”] off so radically from the objective 
world, we lose our right to think of moves within the space we are picturing as content 
involving. So we stop being able to picture it as the space of concepts. (McDowell 2000 
[1995]: 418)
If we refuse to make sense of the idea of direct openness to the manifest world, we 
u ndermine the idea of being in the space of reasons at all, and hence the idea of being 
in a position to have things appear to one in a certain way. (McDowell 2000 [1995]: 
418)
In any case of perfect illusion or hallucination, we can explain its character by reference 
to the case of veridical perception, and we cannot give an explanation of what it is like 
except by implicit reference to the kind of veridical perception from which it is indistin-
guishable. (Martin 2009 [1997], p. 98)
27   –   I am thinking particularly about the following features of Nyāya: (a) a direct 
realist account of perceptual states; (b) a notion that external object(s) and 
property(ies) are partly constitutive of the mental states that grasp them — 
epitomized by Jayanta’s notion that pramāṇa-born cognition must be artha- 
utpannam, born of contact with its object; (c) a disjunctive account of cognition, 
involving the notion of pramāṇa-ābhāsa, “semblance of a pramāṇa”; (d) a de-
fense of default trust in cognition, as evinced in the arguments above as well as 
other arguments; and (e) a defense of the power of perception to capture deep 
structural features of the external world, including substances and relationships 
between universals. I plan to develop this theme more fully in a future paper.
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